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Down to Earth Underdetermination
GORDON BELOT
University of Michigan
Geologists, chemists, biologists, and many physicists tend to be impatient
when they hear about the problem of underdetermination of theory by evi-
dence. A common response is to declare that this is simply a philosopher’s
problem (in the pejorative sense), a conundrum that people with a certain
quirky intelligence might play with, but something of no relevance to the
sciences. That response is overblown. . . . Yet the sound instinct expressed
in quick dismissal is a legitimate wish to be shown convincing examples
across the range of scientific disciplines.
Philip Kitcher
Science, Truth, and Democracy
Finally, the fact that solving the inverse problem yields a set of model
parameters that describe the observations well does not necessarily mean
that the resulting model actually reflects physical reality. . . . In fact, we
often have no way of determining what the reality is. For example, we will
never truly know the composition and temperature of the earth’s core
because we cannot go there. This limitation remains in spite of the fact
that over time our models of the core have become increasingly consistent
with seismological data, experimental results about materials at high
pressure and temperature, and other data including inferences from meteor-
ites about the composition of the solar system.
Seth Stein and Michael Wysession
An Introduction to Seismology, Earthquakes, and Earth Structure
1. Introduction
Underdetermination arguments against scientific realism have a familiar
structure. First it is argued that underdetermination of theory by evidence is
endemic: for any scientific theory, it would be unsurprising were there to
exist a theory empirically equivalent to it (i.e., a theory that makes identical
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predictions about all observable matters of fact). Then it is argued that such
underdetermination undermines scientific realism: from the (not unlikely)
existence of empirically equivalent alternatives to extant theories, it follows
that we should have little confidence in even the approximate truth of our
current theories, no matter how well they fit all available evidence. Of
course, such arguments rest on the presupposition that there is some fixed
salient distinction between the observable and the unobservable.1
My interest here is in the first step. Realists tend to see the burden of
proof in this matter as lying with anti-realists.2 It is not enough to point to
examples of pairs of physical theories that are empirically equivalent rela-
tive to some criterion of observability (Ptolemy and Copernicus, suitably
restricted); nor to give general recipes for producing a theory empirically
equivalent to a given theory that invoke concepts with dubious scientific
credentials (“just allow miniature blue gnomes to do whatever work elec-
trons are supposed to do”); nor to offer a general recipe that takes as input
not genuine scientific theories, but rather formal surrogates for such theo-
ries.3 What is wanted is a more or less general recipe for reliably generating
an empirically equivalent alternative to a given theory—a recipe that takes
as input and gives as output things that look like actual scientific theories.
Absent that, it is widely felt, realists are entitled to assume that the
existence of theories empirically equivalent to our best theories is an idle
philosophical fantasy.
I do not have such a recipe to offer. But I think that reflection on some
down to earth considerations shows that realists are mistaken about where
the burden of proof lies.
2. Underdetermination in Geophysics
We can investigate the internal structure of the Earth by making measure-
ments at its surface.
Gravimetry. The problem of gravimetry is to reconstruct the distribution of
mass density within the Earth from knowledge of the gravitational field at
points on the surface of the Earth.
Travel-Time Tomography. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, nuclear
detonations, etc., send compression waves through the interior of the Earth.
Like light rays travelling through a medium of variable refractive index,
these can be thought of as travelling along lines whose departure from
1 For an influential attack on all three aspects of underdetermination arguments, see Lau-
dan and Leplin (1991).
2 For discussion and references, see Stanford (2013, §3.2).
3 See Earman (1993) for a sophisticated and illuminating implementation of this last strat-
egy.
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straightness is caused by variations in the structure of the material through
which they propagate.4 The problem of travel-time tomography (also
known as the kinematic inverse problem) is to reconstruct the way that the
index of refraction (speed of waves) varies within the Earth from knowl-
edge of how long it takes news of a seismic disturbance at certain points
on the Earth’s surface to reach certain other points on the Earth’s surface.5
Neutrino Tomography. To an excellent first approximation, neutrinos travel
through the Earth along straight lines, with the chance of a given neutrino
being absorbed being proportional to the nucleon density in the matter
through which it passes. The problem of neutrino tomography is to recon-
struct the pattern of nucleon density within the Earth from knowledge of
the rate of attenuation of beams of neutrinos passing between given pairs
of points at the surface of the Earth.6
For problems of these sorts, the family of possible internal structures of the
Earth under consideration will be vast: completely specifying the internal
state of the planet would involve specifying the values of infinitely many
quantities (e.g., one might specify the density at each of an infinite set of
points internal to the planet). Performing a finite number of measurements
external to the planet will allow one to determine the values of only finitely
many such quantities. So the family of models consistent with any finite set
of measurements will still be vast (infinite-dimensional). It is standard to
appeal to considerations of simplicity and general plausibility in cutting
down this underdetermination.7
Short-term underdetermination of theory by data is only to be expected
—few interesting scientific questions can be settled absolutely definitively
by looking at a finite amount of data.8 What about underdetermination in
the infinite long-run in which complete data sets become available? Here
we find interesting differences between methods of investigating the Earth’s
internal structure. For neutrino tomography, underdetermination evaporates
in the limit of complete data: if the rate of attenuation for neutrino beams
between each pair of points at the Earth’s surface is fixed, then the relevant
4 Here we pretend, somewhat unrealistically, that the Earth is an isotropic elastic solid and
focus only on one of the many types of waves generated by seismic events.
5 See Uhlmann (2001) for an introduction to the mathematics of travel-time tomography.
6 This problem is analogous to the problem of x-ray tomography and other problems of
medical imaging—for a survey, see Deans (2007, Chapter 1). The idea of neutrino
tomography, which has not yet been put into practice, seems to have originated in a sci-
ence fiction novel, Clement (1971). For a recent discussion of this technique, see, e.g.,
Winter (2006).
7 For discussions of several popular approaches, see Parker (1994) and Tarantola (2005).
See also the philosophical literature on this topic: Miyake (2013). Note that very similar
problems arise in medical imaging; see, e.g., Smith et al. (1977) and Helgason (2011,
§I.7.B).
8 For a dramatic illustration of this point, see Theorem 4.2 in Smith et al. (1977).
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aspects of the internal structure of the Earth are fixed.9 The situation is quite
different in the case of gravimetry: corresponding to any given configuration
of the gravitational field external to the Earth is a vast (infinite-dimensional)
family of possible internal structures (some of which will differ very dra-
matically from one another).10 Travel-time tomography constitutes an inter-
esting intermediate case: for some internal structures the Earth might have,
underdetermination would evaporate in the limit of complete data; for
others, even complete data would be consistent with a vast and various
family of possibilities.11
Of course, in the case of the Earth and other planets, we have ways of
finding out about internal structure other than by making measurements at
the surface (in principle, if not in practice). But the techniques considered
above can be used to study the internal structure of the Sun and other stars
(in principle and, in some cases, in practice—see, e.g., Nolet 2008). And in
the stellar case there is considerable plausibility to the idea that we never
will (and never could) have any way of investigating internal structure
directly.
So there is a sense in which underdetermination of scientific theory by
(all possible) evidence is not only possible but actual. I suspect that most
realists will be unfazed by this observation. For consider a widely-discussed
case that is in some ways analogous to our examples. In general relativity,
even infinitely long-lived observers cannot in general determine the topol-
ogy of the cosmos in which they live.12 Many realists accept that this is a
case of underdetermination that points up a limit to the reach of scientific
reason.13 But few see here much of a threat to the project of scientific real-
ism.14 It is, for instance, sometimes asserted that the real battlefield in the
debate over scientific realism is the status of theories—rather than that of
particular facts, such as the topology of our cosmos (or, presumably, the
internal structure of the Earth or the Sun).15
However, it is not clear to me that there is a stable form of scientific
realism that concedes so easily that science is incapable of resolving some
questions that are ordinarily regarded as scientific.
9 See, e.g., Smith et al. (1977, §4) or Helgason (2011, Chapter I).
10 For helpful discussions, see, e.g., Anger (1990, §§3.2, 4.2, and 5.3), Michel and Fokas
(2008), or Sanso and Tscherning (1989).
11 For relevant results, see, e.g., Croke (1991) and Pestov and Uhlmann (2005).
12 See Glymour (1977), Malament (1977), and Manchak (2009). For the role of this prob-
lem in the genesis of constructive empiricism, see van Fraassen (1985, Postscript §1).
13 See, e.g., Earman (1993, §9), Glymour (1980 354 ff.), and Stanford (2006, 13 f.). For a
dissenting voice, see Norton (2011).
14 Earman (1993) is perhaps an exception.
15 For this viewpoint, see Stanford (2006, 13 f.) and Norton (2011, §3).
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(a) I suspect that many realists will agree that Fine puts his finger on an
important sense in which, from the point of view of scientific practice,
constructive empiricism and other anti-realisms ask us to make an epistemi-
cally invidious distinction:
[Constructive empiricism] can follow the usual lattice of inferences and
reasons that issues in scientific beliefs only until it reaches the border of
the observable, at which point the shift is made from belief to acceptance.
But the inferential network that winds back and forth across this border is
in no way different from that on the observable side alone. (1986, 167)
But if that is what bothers realists about constructive empiricism, then they
should also be bothered by the suggestion that belief should be withheld in
cases of infinite long-run underdetermination. After all, in the short run the
lattice of inferences concerning, e.g., the internal structure of the Earth will
look much the same whether we are working with a technique for which
underdetermination vanishes in the infinite long run (such as determination
of the internal magnetic field from the external magnetic field) or one such
for which it does not (such as gravimetry).16
(b) Consider the proposal floated by Earman (1993, §11): Bayesian agents
should distance themselves from their judgements of the relative plausibility
of pairs of hypotheses just in case convergence of their own opinion to the
true hypothesis cannot be expected even in the infinite long-run. Following
this advice can lead to disaster—e.g., I may end up being thoroughly confi-
dent that the relation between the variables that I am investigating is given
by a certain function, but be unwilling to pronounce on whether that func-
tion is or is not continuous (see Belot 2013).
3. Underdetermination and Inverse Problems
I contend that, seen in the proper light, examples like those from geophysics
discussed above serve to undermine in a quite radical way the orthodox
perception of the dialectic between realists and anti-realists regarding the
question of the existence of empirically equivalent rivals to scientific theories.
16 On the uniqueness of magnetic field reconstruction, see, e.g., Gubbins (2007). Authors
of textbooks on geophysics will often note that there is an in-principle problem of under-
determination in gravimetry that is absent in some other problems. But this observation
has no apparent impact on the advice offered to practitioners facing problems of either
sort—see, e.g., Parker (1994, 241). Indeed, some authors are explicit about the practical
irrelevance of infinite long-run considerations: e.g., Scales and Snieder remark that while
the problem of infinite long-run uniqueness is “hotly debated in the mathematical litera-
ture on inverse problems, it is largely irrelevant for practical inverse problems” (2000,
1708). For what it is worth: so far as I can tell, the authors of the second epigraph above
do not take the distinction between those problems in which underdetermination evapo-
rates in the infinite long run and others to be epistemologically salient.
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The geophysical problems discussed above are examples of a type of
problem that is endemic in the mathematical sciences. One has a space, X,
of possible states of some system. There is some interesting class of obser-
vations that can be made on this system. There is some space, Y, whose
points correspond to possible (joint) outcomes of this family of observa-
tions. Some background theory tells one, for each possible state x in X,
what evidence y in Y would be gathered were the system in that state and
one were to perform each of the possible observations on that system. From
this perspective, the work done by this theory can be summed up in a func-
tion K that maps states in X to evidence sets in Y that takes as input a possi-
ble state of the system and gives as output the corresponding body of
outcomes of observations. This is a so-called direct problem. Corresponding
to each direct problem is an inverse problem: given a body of evidence y in
Y, find those states x in X such that y = K(x). Each of the geophysical prob-
lems considered above is an inverse problem of this kind.
The question whether or not, for each body of observation outcomes, there
is a unique compatible state of the system is the question whether K is or is
not an invertible function. In our geophysical examples, if our focus is on a
finite number of observations performed at the surface of the Earth, then the
relevant map K is never invertible: for any y there is a vast number of compati-
ble x. If we focus instead on the class of all possible observations of a given
type performable at the surface of the Earth, we find that in the case of neu-
trino tomography the relevant map K is invertible—but that the maps corre-
sponding to the problems of gravimetry and travel-time tomography are not.
These examples from geophysics are not atypical. Very often, one is
interested in systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom. In that case,
a finite number of observations will never suffice to determine the state of
the system. If one considers an infinite number of possible observations, the
underdetermination may or may not disappear—this depends on the details
of the theory determining the connection between states and data and on the
space of states in question.17
Consider now the mother of all inverse problems. The space X is the
space of all possible total theories (laws and initial conditions). The space
Y is the space of all possible (joint) observation outcomes. The map K
associates with each theory x in X the body of evidence y in Y that would
be available were x true.
17 One might be tempted to reason that, at least under ideal circumstances, invertible K
ought to be typical. After all: if X and Y are vector spaces of the same finite dimension
and K is a linear map, then, generically, K is invertible (the set of invertible n by n
matrices forms an open and dense subset of the space of n by n matrices). But this result
does not carry over to the infinite-dimensional setting, even in the linear case. See Boul-
din (1990).
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Clearly there are difficulties in making this picture precise. The notion of
a space of all possible theories is of dubious coherence—e.g., on cardinality
grounds.18 The notion of a space of all possible observations is if anything
even more fraught. And the map K is also beset by difficult questions: in
order to make sense of it, one would presumably have to think of the back-
ground theory that underwrites the passage from a theory of everything
(including initial conditions as well as laws) to an account of what would
we would observe were that theory true as including logic together with
some account, of the sort sketched in van Fraassen (1980), of how theories
internally demarcate the boundary between the observable and the unobserv-
able.
Still, the picture makes rough heuristic sense. And in terms of this pic-
ture, the question in dispute between the realist and the anti-realist is
whether or not K is invertible—or, perhaps more plausibly, whether for a
typical or generic body of evidence y there is a unique theory x such that
y=K(x).
It is usually held that there is a presumption in favour of an affirmative
answer here. Perhaps that seems plausible when anti-realists, after muttering
for a while about one or two suggestive examples, assert without further
argument that there are likely theories empirically equivalent to our favour-
ite theories.
But the dialectic takes on a quite different cast when one thinks of anti-
realists as advancing a claim about a very complicated inverse problem.
There is not yet any general theory of inverse problems. One cannot defini-
tively assert: most inverse problems do (or do not) involve underdetermina-
tion of theory by observation.19 At the same time, a perusal of the literature
on inverse problems that arise in contemporary physical science suggests
that it would be, to put it mildly, highly incautious to suppose that the map
determined by a complicated and ill-understood direct problem was invert-
ible and hence that there was no underdetermination in the associated
inverse problem. But that is just what realists are supposing in asserting that
the burden of proof lies with anti-realists in their dispute over the first stage
of the underdetermination argument against scientific realism.20
18 Prima facie, for each cardinal number, there is a theory whose space of states is a Hil-
bert space with dimension of that cardinality. So the possible theories form a proper
class rather than a set—which means that it is difficult to speak of the space of all theo-
ries as having a structure. Note that while renormalization group methods in quantum
field theory are sometimes said to be set in a “space of all theories,” something quite
restricted is in fact meant. See, e.g., Costello (2011, Chapter 1).
19 In fact, some authors come tolerably close to saying that most inverse problems suffer
from nonuniqueness (see, e.g., Anger 1990, 37 and 63 or Parker 1994, 293). I know of
no authors who come close to asserting that most inverse problems enjoy uniqueness.
20 Thanks to Kevin Coffey and Teru Miyake for helpful comments on an earlier version.
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